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SEC Investigations and Securities Class
Actions: An Empirical Comparison
Stephen J. Choi and A. C. Pritchard*

Using actions with both an SEC investigation and a class action as our baseline, we compare
the targeting of SEC-only investigations with class-action-only lawsuits. Looking at measures
of information asymmetry, we find that investors in the market perceive greater
information asymmetry following the public announcement of the underlying violation for
class-action-only lawsuits compared with SEC-only investigations. Turning to sanctions, we
find that the incidence of top officer resignation is greater for class-action-only lawsuits
relative to SEC-only investigations. Our findings are consistent with the private
enforcement targeting disclosure violations at least as precisely as (if not more so than)
SEC enforcement.

I. INTRODUCTION
Critics of securities class actions (e.g., Rose 2008) commonly contrast those suits, which
are frequently dismissed, with SEC enforcement actions, which typically settle at the
same time as they are filed. According to those critics, the high dismissal rate for class
actions suggests a scattershot approach and that the SEC is superior to plaintiffs’ lawyers
in targeting disclosure violations. Critics of class actions argue that more precise targeting of suits by the SEC yields a stronger deterrent punch for SEC enforcement relative
to class actions. If one assumes that: (1) targeting significantly affects deterrence, and
(2) the SEC could maintain the precision of its targeting if the agency were allocated
greater resources, it follows from this argument that shifting enforcement dollars to the
*Address correspondence to A. C. Pritchard, University of Michigan School of Law, 625 S. State St., Ann Arbor,
MI 48109-1215; email: acplaw@umich.edu. Choi is Murray and Kathleen Bring Professor of Law, New York University; Pritchard is Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
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government enforcement would yield a bigger deterrent impact for the marginal dollar
spent (Bratton & Wachter 2011).
In this study, we attempt to shed light on a key premise of this argument—the relative precision of private and public enforcement in targeting disclosure violations. We
think that critics contrasting securities class actions and SEC enforcement actions may
be comparing apples to oranges. The comparisons ignore a critical institutional detail:
SEC enforcement actions are brought only after the SEC has done a substantial investigation, aided by the SEC’s subpoena power, which yields cooperation from defendants
even when not explicitly invoked. By contrast, plaintiffs filing securities class actions cannot seek discovery from defendants while a motion to dismiss is pending, so plaintiffs
must rely almost exclusively on publicly available information, which explains the high
dismissal rate.
Instead of looking solely at filed SEC enforcement actions, we compare SEC investigations with class action suits against public companies. The ultimate goal of both SEC
enforcement lawyers and plaintiffs’ attorneys is to uncover and sanction fraud. We recognize that class action attorneys and SEC attorneys face different incentives, which
might affect their targeting of suits and investigations. The profit incentive for class
action attorneys is well known. In contrast, the SEC works to maximize the number of
cases brought, penalties, and media attention. In a recent speech, the SEC’s Director of
Enforcement trumpeted that “we filed 755 actions last year—the most ever filed in the
history of the Commission. And we obtained orders for over $4 billion in monetary sanctions—nearly 20% larger than our previous high.”1 We take those incentives as a given,
and compare the targeting decisions of class action lawyers and the SEC that flow from
them. We conjecture that the SEC and plaintiffs’ attorneys have roughly the same access
to information when they begin an investigation or file a class action suit. We also compare public and private enforcement at later stages in the proceedings: (1) SEC formal
investigations and class actions that have survived a motion to dismiss and (2) settled
SEC enforcement actions and settled class actions.
To facilitate our comparison, we split our cases into three categories: SEC Only,
Class Action Only, and Both. SEC Only involves investigations of public companies only
by the SEC. Class Action Only involves filings against public companies only by private
plaintiffs’ attorneys. Both involves both an SEC investigation and a class action. Using
these three categories allows us to assess the targeting precision of both the SEC and
private plaintiffs’ attorneys.
We compare the relative precision of targeting by the SEC and plaintiffs’ lawyers
using three market-based metrics of information asymmetry: changes in earnings
response coefficients, institutional ownership, and the bid-ask spread. Prior work suggests that these measures correlate with the market’s perception of the likelihood of
fraud. We also examine the decisions of corporate boards to terminate CEOs and CFOs
in response to SEC investigations and class actions. We argue that boards have access to
1
Andrew Ceresney, Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21,
2014), available at: http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543515297.
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nonpublic information relating to the officer’s culpability, so the termination decision
may also proxy for the likelihood of fraud. Overall, the evidence we present here contradicts the conventional wisdom that the SEC targets disclosure violations more precisely
than do plaintiffs’ lawyers.
We proceed as follows. In Section II, we develop our hypotheses based on our
review of prior literature relating to SEC enforcement actions and securities class
actions. Section III describes our sample and variables. Section IV reports the results of
our tests of our hypotheses. Section V concludes with a discussion of our results and
their potential policy implications.

II. PRIOR LITERATURE

AND

HYPOTHESES

A. Market Reactions to Disclosure Violations
Numerous studies have shown significant stock price reactions to the announcement of
potential disclosure violations (Kinney & McDaniel 1989; Karpoff & Lott 1993; Palmrose
et al. 2004). Similar results are found for studies focusing specifically on SEC enforcement actions (Feroz et al. 1991; Karpoff et al. 2008a; Nelson et al. 2009; Griffin & Sun
2011) and for securities fraud class actions (Griffin et al. 2004). These findings confirm
the common-sense intuition that the discovery of potential fraud is bad for companies.
The limitation of these studies is that stock price reactions cannot disentangle the reaction to possible disclosure violations—and potential culpability for those violations—
from reaction to a business setback. Stock prices may be responding to potential litigation costs and problems revealed with the firm’s underlying business as much as to the
loss of credibility flowing from the disclosure problem. Moreover, these studies do not
distinguish between different types of enforcement. In comparing SEC enforcement
with private plaintiffs, stock price reactions are clearly more relevant to the litigation
choices of the latter, as private plaintiffs must prove both loss causation and damages in
order to recover. A larger stock price drop makes satisfying those elements easier.
B. Sanctions
Cox et al. (2004) find that securities class actions lead to larger settlements if there is
also a parallel SEC enforcement proceeding. They do not, however, examine SEC
enforcement proceedings without a parallel class action. Karpoff et al. (2008a) find that
both government penalties and class action settlements are related to the magnitude of
the harm, although these monetary sanctions are only a small portion of the loss of
wealth experienced by shareholders of defendant companies. As with stock price reactions, however, SEC enforcement and class action settlements are difficult to compare
head-to-head. Culpability for disclosure violations will be relevant to the resolution of
both SEC enforcement proceedings and class actions, but the SEC has a wider range of
sanctions available in its enforcement actions. That broader range of sanctions may
influence the monetary component of settlements in SEC actions because different
types of sanctions may be bargained away in negotiating a settlement. In addition, the
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SEC may be trading off sanctions against the company and sanctions against individuals.
By contrast, class actions are typically limited to seeking money damages (and plaintiffs’
attorneys are compensated with a percentage of those damages), and those damages are
typically paid by the company and its insurer. Moreover, private plaintiffs need to prove
more elements than the SEC in order to prevail at trial, so settlement negotiations presumably take place with those hurdles in the background. Thus, comparing sanctions,
while relevant to consequences, is unlikely to shed much light on the precision of targeting because a variety of other factors will be at play.
C. Market Measures of Information Asymmetry
Although event studies and sanctions are of limited utility in assessing the precision of
targeting, alternative market measures have been used to assess the effects of potential
fraud on the information environment. These measures are generally considered to be
proxies for investors’ perceptions of the reliability of disclosure in the market for a company’s common stock. For example, Dechow et al. (1996), studying a sample of companies charged by the SEC in accounting enforcement actions, find an increase in the bidask spread, a drop in analyst following, an increase in short interest, and an increase in
the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. These findings are confirmed by later
work using alternative measures of market confidence in disclosure. Murphy et al.
(2009) show that share price responses for firms accused of misconduct correlate with
subsequent changes in the level of certainty about earnings. In addition, reputational
harm can result in less investor confidence in earnings announcements (Nelson et al.
2008). Finally, institutional ownership declines significantly after a restatement (Burns
et al. 2010). These market responses provide a cleaner measure of the market’s assessment of the likelihood of underlying fraud than do event studies. None of these studies,
however, compares SEC enforcement with securities class actions, which is the principal
contribution of this article.
D. Consequences for Officers
As fictional legal entities, companies are incapable of committing fraud; it is the misstatements and omissions of the corporation’s agents—typically high-level officers—that
are attributed to the company. Given the adverse consequences for companies from disclosure violations, it is generally accepted that fraud may reflect agency costs by officers
concerned with job retention or incentive compensation. Prior work suggests that
boards respond to those agency costs. Given that directors have access to nonpublic
information arising from internal investigations (a routine response to allegations of
potential fraud), the retention/termination decisions by corporate directors may serve
as a particularly strong proxy for culpability. Karpoff et al. (2008b) find that over 90 percent of the individuals identified as responsible for fraud lose their jobs by the end of
the enforcement proceedings. Niehaus and Roth (1999) find that turnover of CEOs is
higher for companies named in securities class actions relative to nonsued firms. This
result is confirmed by Humphery-Jenner (2012), who also finds that CFOs are more
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likely to be terminated after the filing of a securities class action. None of these studies
compare SEC enforcement with class actions.

E. Framework and Hypotheses
For our comparison of SEC investigations and securities class actions we use the Both
category as our baseline for two reasons. First, by definition the Both category includes
situations in which both the SEC and private plaintiffs’ attorneys separately decide to
initiate an action (an investigation by the SEC and a class action filing by a private plaintiffs’ attorney). Culpability is relevant to both the SEC and plaintiffs’ attorneys because
it similarly influences both their likelihood of prevailing and potential penalties/damages. Consequently, a consensus in pursuing an underlying disclosure violation likely
reflects the salience of that violation.2 Thus, the Both category provides a benchmark
validating our measures of the likelihood and magnitude of a disclosure violation. If a
public company is investigated only by the SEC, or sued only in a class action, we expect
a lower probability of underlying fraud relative to the Both category. If this supposition
is correct, the SEC Only and Class Action Only categories will each compare unfavorably
with Both.
Our tripartite division allows us to construct a number of testable hypotheses. In
particular, it allows us to assess the marginal impact of eliminating either SEC investigations or class actions on the pool of public companies targeted for disclosure violations.
If actions in the Class Action Only category compare unfavorably to our SEC Only category, this finding would support the conventional wisdom that private enforcement is
less precise than SEC enforcement.
For our comparison we rely on three market metrics that have been accepted in
the literature discussed above as proxies for the reliability of disclosure: decrease
in earnings responsiveness and institutional ownership and increase in bid-ask spread.
In addition, we rely on a measure of sanctions that may reflect directors’ superior information about potential culpability: officer resignations.
These metrics allow us to test the following hypotheses:
H1: Companies targeted by class actions will have smaller decrease in earnings responsiveness relative to SEC companies (Earnings Responsiveness
Hypothesis).
H2: Companies targeted by class actions will have a smaller drop in institutional ownership relative to SEC companies (Institutional Ownership Hypothesis).
2
One concern is that the SEC (or plaintiffs’ attorneys) may systematically account for the initial identification of
cases in the Both category. Other work (Dyck et al. 2010), however, finds that only a small percentage of fraud is
uncovered by either the SEC or the class action bar. In most cases, the Both category involves cases with public
indicia of fraud from the company or source other than the SEC or the class action bar. Moreover, it does not
appear that either the SEC or the class action is the “first mover” in the Both category: for our Both sample, the
SEC-initiated investigation is disclosed first in 116 of the cases, the class action was filed first in 117, and two cases
were commenced the same day.
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H3: Companies targeted by class actions will have a smaller increase in residual bid-ask spread relative to the SEC companies (Bid-Ask Spread Hypothesis).
H4: Officers of companies targeted by class actions will be less likely to be
terminated relative to SEC companies (Officer Resignation Hypothesis).

III. DATA
A. Sample
Our sample consists of public companies sued in a securities class action or that disclosed an SEC investigation between 2004 through 2007. We obtained the securities
class actions from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. We identified
SEC investigations through NEXIS searches as well as searches of SEC filings by public
companies. The SEC typically does not disclose its investigations unless and until it files
an enforcement action, so our search relies on disclosures by companies that they are
being investigated. The SEC does not mandate disclosure of an SEC investigation; consequently, we may miss investigations that the company deems immaterial. We conjecture
that these undiscovered SEC investigations likely involved few SEC resources and are of
small economic importance. We use securities price data available on the Center for
Research on Security Prices (CRSP).
One concern with our comparison is that the initiation of a SEC investigation may
not be comparable with the decision to file suit by a plaintiffs’ attorney. To address this
concern, we also look to see if there are differences among our categories for investigations/cases that survive an initial screening process. We create two subsamples reflecting
roughly parallel later stages: (1) SEC investigations and class actions that survived an initial screening process and (2) those that resulted in settlements. These subsamples provide a window on the relative strength of the screening processes used for SEC
investigations and class actions, while continuing to provide an apples-to-apples comparison. For the SEC investigations, we use formal orders of investigation: SEC Only (Formal). The SEC staff has determined that there is enough evidence of a securities law
violation to warrant the request of a formal order of investigation. For the Class Action
Only category, we identify cases that have survived a motion to dismiss by the defendants: Class Action Only (Win MTD). A court has determined that the plaintiff’s complaint alleges sufficient indicia of fraud, particularly scienter, to meet the heightened
standards imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. For our baseline
Both category, we identify situations in which both the SEC has made a formal order of
investigation and the class action has survived a motion to dismiss: Both (Formal 1 Win
MTD).
The screening process is not complete until the case is finally settled. The SEC
provides companies with an opportunity to respond to a Wells notice that it intends to
charge the company; for class actions, plaintiffs’ lawyers will gain access to discovery if
they withstand a motion to dismiss. Access to additional information should lead to further screening. Accordingly, we further narrowed the screened categories to include
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only cases that led to a settlement: SEC Only (Settle) and Class Action Only (Settle).
For the Both category, we limited this subsample to cases in which the SEC secured a
settlement: Both (Settle).
Our final screen narrows the categories of settled cases to only those that include
allegations of a Rule 10b-5 violation, which requires scienter. SEC investigations are initially aimed at uncovering fraud. Those investigations may, however, result in evidence
of behavior that violates the securities laws, but does not significantly call into question
disclosure quality or reliability because it was unintentional. For example, Sections
17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act and Section 13 of the Exchange Act involve disclosure violations, but they do not require the SEC to show scienter, so they provide a
fallback set of violations for an enforcement action if the evidence uncovered will not
support allegations of intentional deception. (From an enforcement attorney’s perspective, it may be better to allege a negligence count than come away with nothing.) Private
plaintiffs cannot pursue those causes of action for disclosure violations, but they can
pursue negligence-based cases in connection with public offerings under Sections 11
and 12 of the Securities Act, in connection with tender offers under Section 14 of the
Exchange Act, and under the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts. To
the extent that SEC investigations and class actions involve allegations of disclosure violations that do not require intentional wrongdoing, the market may view them as raising
fewer concerns about management credibility. If there were evidence of fraud, a Rule
10b-5 allegation presumably would have been alleged because it maximizes potential
penalties and/or damages.3 This final pool is necessarily limited to settled actions, as we
do not know what allegations will be made by the SEC until an enforcement action is
filed. This restricted sample allows us to focus on the effect of scienter allegations,
which may be treated more seriously by the market. The cases that remain in this Rule
10b-5 category are arguably the most comparable, with differing elements only for loss
causation and damages. This final screen does, however, substantially reduce the number of observations available for statistical analysis, and thus statistical power.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample (variable definitions are provided in the Appendix). In Panel A, we see that the SEC Only and Class Action Only
categories are roughly similar in number, with substantially fewer companies in the
Both category. We see that roughly half the observations in the SEC Only and Class
Action Only categories are likely to survive the initial screening process, while the Both
category has a substantially higher survival rate (81.3 percent).
Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics for key variables in our analysis. We
see that the screening process matters, and that cases that survive an initial screen are
much more likely to settle. In particular, the settlement rate for class actions nearly doubles for cases that survive a motion to dismiss. Turning to other characteristics, the incidence of restatements—essentially a concession by the company of a material
3
The SEC sometimes gives up Rule 10b-5 allegations in the process of negotiating a settlement, particularly if the
SEC has not made the particular action an enforcement priority. It is unlikely that it negotiates away Rule 10b-5
allegations where the evidence of scienter is strongest, so relying on settled Rule 10b-5 cases biases our results in
favor of the SEC.
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SEC Only
0.340
Class Action Only
0.477

p Value
0.000
p Value
0.003

Panel D: Outcomes

Both
0.481
Both
0.596

Incidence

n/a
0.367
0.420
0.400
0.653
0.620
0.193
0.120
0.193

SEC Only

Panel C: Type of Investigation

SEC Only
17.0
Class Action Only
18.6

0.138
0.533
0.975
0.738
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0.075

Both
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p Value
0.727
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0.000
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0.874
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n/a
0.037
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Class Action Only

NOTES: Panel B: Descriptive statistics are all measured prior to first public disclosure leading to the investigation or lawsuit. For the whole sample: p value comparing
incidence of settlement for SEC Only and Both is 0.000; p value comparing the incidence of settlement for Class Action Only and Both is 0.000. For the Formal 1 Win
MTD sample: p value comparing incidence of settlement for SEC Only and Both is 0.000; p value comparing the incidence of settlement for Class Action Only and
Both is 0.152.
Panel D: Monetary penalty is in millions of dollars. Incidence p value is from a chi2 test. Monetary penalty p value is from t test of difference of means between SEC
Only and either Both or Class Action Only as indicated above. Wilcoxon rank-sum test of difference in median SEC monetary penalty between SEC Only and Both categories is significant (p value 5 0.012). Wilcoxon rank-sum test of difference in median class action settlement between Class Action Only and Both categories is significant (p value 5 0.000).

Class Action Settlement

SEC Settlement

Section 11 Securities Act
Section 17(a) Securities Act
Rule 10b-5 Exchange Act
Section 13(a) Exchange Act
Section 13(b)(2)(A) Exchange Act
Section 13(b)(2)(B) Exchange Act
Section 13(b)(5) Exchange Act
Section 14 Exchange Act
Section 30A Exchange Act

Violation

Table 1: Continued
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misstatement—is substantially higher for the Both category, which may explain the consensus among the SEC and plaintiffs’ lawyers in these cases. Finally, we note that market
capitalization is greatest for the SEC Only firms, particularly relative to the Class Action
Only firms.
Panel C of Table 1 reports the alleged violations. The sample for these statistics is
necessarily truncated for the SEC investigations in the sample. We do not know the
actual allegations until an enforcement action has been filed, which typically does not
happen until the SEC and the defendants have agreed to a settlement. We see that the
SEC Only category stands out in having a substantially lower incidence of Rule 10b-5
allegations (42 percent). Rule 10b-5 is the bread-and-butter for private actions; it is
alleged in nearly all of the Both cases, and in 87 percent of Class Action Only. What violations does the SEC allege when it does not uncover evidence sufficient to pursue a
Rule 10b-5 violation, but still decides to file an enforcement action? Predominantly, Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act and Section 13 of the Exchange Act, which
involve disclosure violations, but neither of which requires the SEC to prove scienter,
unlike Rule 10b-5.4 These causes are not available to private litigants; conversely, the
SEC cannot rely on the private cause of action under Section 11.
We obtained the settlement outcomes for the SEC investigations from the SEC’s
enforcement releases. For the class actions, we obtain the settlement amount from the
settlement order.5 We compare the incidence and amounts of settlements for our three
categories in Table 1, Panel D. The Both category is considerably more likely to result
in a settlement for the SEC than the SEC Only category. Over 48 percent of the SEC
investigations resulted in a settlement for the Both category, compared to 34.0 percent
in the SEC Only category (difference significant at the 1 percent level). For those investigations that led to a settlement, however, there is no significant difference in the
amount of monetary penalty extracted by the SEC, with the SEC Only category being
slightly larger ($17.0 million compared to $14.8 for Both). It appears that the investigations in the SEC Only category lead to more dry holes for the agency, but the consequences are no less severe for the company involved when the SEC brings an
enforcement action.

4
The negotiation of the settlement will typically include negotiation over the violation to be alleged by the SEC.
Defendants will seek to avoid Rule 10b-5 allegations because of the scienter element, which implies culpability.
Defendants will be more amenable to Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) and Section 13 violations and may be willing to
pay greater penalty amounts in exchange for the omission of Rule 10b-5 counts. Section 17(a)(1) requires scienter, but it is essentially redundant to a Rule 10b-5 allegation; they are typically charged in tandem.
5
The SEC formally terminated many of the SEC investigations that did not settle. In the SEC Only category,
24.95 percent of the SEC investigations were formally terminated. In the Both category, 24.35 percent of the SEC
investigations were formally terminated. Other SEC investigations disappeared with no resolution; we assume that
they were informally terminated. Almost all the class action suits that were not settled resulted in dismissal. In
the Both category, 37.8 percent of the suits resulted in dismissal; in the Class Action Only category, 49.1 percent
resulted in dismissal. The remainder of the class action suit outcomes included largely summary judgments for
the defendant and class certification motions denied. There was one trial verdict for the plaintiff in the Class
Action Only category.
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Event Studies
Violation Date

SEC Only
(Formal)
(Settle)
Both
(Formal 1 Win MTD)
(Settle)
Class Action Only
(Win MTD)
(Settle)

N

Abnormal
Return

Positive:
Negative

Patell Z

231
113
81
162
134
122
222
106
98

20.88%
20.78%
20.55%
27.31%
27.35%
27.07%
211.42%
212.36%
213.27%

88:143
44:69<
35:46
47:115n
40:94n
36:86n
57:165n
23:83n
20:78n

25.538***
23.250**
22.020*
242.532***
236.933***
234.185***
270.926***
249.507***
251.434***

NOTES: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels for one-sided tests. <, ,
and n and >, , and o correspond to 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels and show the direction of the generalized sign test. Abnormal returns are computed using a one-day window event study centered on the Violation
Date. We estimated the CAR using a market model based on 255 trading days ending 50 days prior to the Violation Date using the CRSP value-weighted market index.

Turning to the differences between Both and Class Action Only, the Both category
is significantly more likely (at the 1 percent level) to lead to a settlement in the class
action, with 59.6 percent of those suits producing a settlement compared with 47.7 percent in the Class Action Only category. Moreover, the size of the Both settlements is
much greater, with a mean of $58.4 million, compared to only $18.6 million for the
Class Action Only category, suggesting that either the evidence or magnitude of violations in the Both category is stronger.
B. Event Study
We first report the stock price reaction from an event study in response to the disclosure of the bad news underlying the alleged disclosure violations.6 We start with a oneday event window centered on the date of the first public disclosure of the problem
leading to the investigation or class action, which we label the Violation Date. At that
point, the market is aware of the potential misconduct, but not what the legal response
will be. As theory (confirmed by prior research) suggests that the abnormal stock market reaction will be negative, we use one-sided tests of significance. We present the
results in Table 2.
The event study measures the stock market’s response to the underlying problem.
The Class Action Only category has by far the strongest negative reaction, an average
abnormal return of 211.42 percent. Class action plaintiffs need to establish loss causation, so this result is not surprising; presumably, plaintiffs’ lawyers are selecting, at least
6
We estimate the abnormal return in our event studies using a market model based on 255 trading days ending
50 days prior to the event date and using the CRSP value-weighted market index.
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in part, on this basis. The Both category is still substantial, 27.31 percent, despite the fact
that category has both a higher incidence of settlements than Class Action Only and settlements of much greater magnitude. The SEC Only category, however, is a mere 20.88
percent, notwithstanding the substantial penalties imposed in those actions. As reported
in Table 2, the Patell z statistics indicate that each of these abnormal returns is significantly different from zero. The smaller negative stock market reaction to the first
announcement of the underlying problem for the SEC Only relative to Class Action Only
is not surprising given that the SEC does not have to prove loss causation and damages.7
We also conduct event studies (reported in Table 2) for our screened subsamples.
The stock price reactions were similar in magnitude to those found for the larger sample, although the returns for the Class Action Only (Win MTD) category are slightly
more negative (212.25 percent). We also found similar abnormal returns for the settlement subsample, with returns for the Class Action Only (Settle) category of 213.15 percent. For the SEC Only and Both categories, the differences for the screened
subsamples from the returns for the overall samples are negligible.8

IV. RESULTS
A. Market Tests of Disclosure Credibility
Stock market reaction may encompass other negative effects on the firm, including the
distraction and litigation expenses the company is likely to incur in defending an action,
regardless of whether it is meritorious. Accordingly, we present a series of tests that measure the impact of the violation on the market’s perception of: (1) the reliability of the
company’s management and disclosures and (2) information asymmetry. We conjecture
7
We subdivided the Both category Violation Dates between those where the SEC initiated the investigation and
those where the class action was filed first. The mean abnormal return for the Violation Date where the SEC initiated the investigation first was 24.72 percent. The mean abnormal return for the Violation Date where a class
action was filed first was 29.53 percent (difference significant at the 5 percent level). Thus, even for those instances where both the SEC investigates and a class action is filed, the market reacts more negatively in those cases in
which a private plaintiff attorney acts first.
8
The market may not fully respond to the first public revelation of the disclosure violation, but instead react to the
later announcement of the start of an SEC investigation or filing of a class action. To assess this possibility, we conduct an event study centered on the Action Date, defined as the date of the first public disclosure of the SEC investigation or class action filing date (and in the case of the Both category, the earlier of the two). The reactions
(untabulated) are smaller, and the range is correspondingly narrower, consistent with market anticipation of legal
action at the Violation Date. The disclosure of an SEC investigation in the SEC Only category generates only a
20.61 percent abnormal response from the market, which is similar in magnitude for the response to the initial disclosure of the bad news that leads to an SEC investigation. The Both category, however, provokes a larger 22.14 percent response. The market response to the disclosure of a class action filing in the Class Action Only category is
only 20.76 percent, marginally more than the SEC Only reaction. We also reestimated the event studies using threeday event windows centered on both the violation and action dates. Unreported, we obtained similar qualitative
results as in Table 2 although the magnitudes of the negative cumulative abnormal returns were generally larger.
For example, the cumulative abnormal return for Both centered on the Violation Date was 211.28 percent and for
Class Action Only centered on the Violation Date was 222.07 percent for the whole sample. Finally, we reestimated
all the models in Table 2 using the CRSP equal-weighted market index instead of the CRSP value-weighted market
index in the event study market models. Unreported, we obtained qualitatively the same results as in Table 2.
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that plausible allegations of disclosure violations, particularly if intentional, will cause
investors to lose trust in a company’s management and its credibility, thus increasing
the market’s perception of information asymmetry.
1. Changes in Earnings Response
Our first test examines the relative impact on the earnings response coefficients for the
firms in our sample following the methodology set forth in Nelson et al. (2008). If the market perceives targets of SEC investigations to be less credible than defendants in securities
class actions, we expect a greater decline in confidence in earnings reports for those firms.
That lack of confidence should manifest itself in relatively smaller cumulative abnormal
returns in response to unexpected earnings subsequent to the revelation of the problem.
To assess this, we measure the cumulative abnormal return in the (21,11) window
centered on the date after the earnings announcement date for the quarters immediately
preceding and following the quarter containing the Violation Date as the dependent variable.9 estimate ordinary least squares models using the cumulative abnormal return as the
dependent variable. We look at our three categories (SEC Only, Both, and Class Action
Only) in separate models, comparing the periods pre-Violation Date and post-Violation
Date (Post). In these models the Pre-Violation Date period is the baseline.
CAR i 5a1ß1i UEPSi 1ß2i Posti 1ß3i UEPSPosti 1ß4i Accountingi 1ß5i Restatementi
1ß6i Market Capi 1ß7i Market=Booki 1ß8i Betai 1Year Controls1ei
To measure unexpected earnings (UEPS), we subtract the most recent IBES median consensus quarterly forecast prior to the earnings announcement from IBES actual earnings, scaled
by price at the end of the fiscal quarter. We include control variables for whether the underlying violation involved an accounting problem (Accounting) and whether there was a
restatement (Restatement). Following Nelson et al. (2008), we include the log of Market
Cap, Market/Book, defined as market value of equity divided by the book value of equity,
and Beta as additional control variables. Beta is the market model beta estimated for 255
trading days ending 50 trading days prior to the quarter earnings announcement date. We
also include year controls for the year of the earnings announcement. To reduce the effect
of outliers, we eliminate observations where the Studentized residuals have an absolute value
of greater than 2. Model 1 is limited to the SEC Only category, Model 2 is the Both category, and Model 3 is the Class Action Only category. The results are presented in Table 3.
In Model 1, for the SEC Only category, UEPS * Post, which reflects the change in
the response to unexpected earnings for the post-period compared with the pre-period, is
not significantly different from zero. We find no evidence that investors reduce their reliance on earnings announcements after the Violation Date when only the SEC initiates an
investigation. In contrast, the coefficient on UEPS * Post is negative and significant at the
9
We estimate the CAR using a market model based on 255 trading days ending 50 days prior to the earnings
announcement date and using the CRSP value-weighted market index. We center on the date after the earnings
announcement because the announcement is typically made after the close of trading for the day.
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Table 3: Change in Earnings Response Coefficient

UEPS
Post
UEPS * Post
Accounting
Restatement
Market Cap
Market/Book
Beta
Constant
Year effects
N
Adj. R2

Model 1
SEC Only

Model 2
Both

Model 3
Class Action Only

0.519*
(0.212)
0.003
(0.008)
0.096
(0.242)
20.007
(0.009)
20.001
(0.010)
0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
20.008
(0.007)
0.035
(0.039)
Yes
193
0.133

6.523**
(2.294)
0.034*
(0.015)
26.536**
(2.280)
0.023
(0.020)
20.006
(0.021)
0.005
(0.005)
20.001
(0.001)
0.006
(0.013)
20.070
(0.073)
Yes
109
0.086

4.9511
(2.831)
0.015
(0.016)
24.9821
(2.830)
20.012
(0.017)
20.031
(0.020)
0.0071
(0.004)
20.005*
(0.002)
0.0201
(0.012)
20.077
(0.070)
Yes
186
0.079

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; 1 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Ordinary least squares regression with
the cumulative abnormal return for a 21 to 11 window centered on the date after the earnings announcement
date for the quarters immediately preceding and following the quarter containing the Violation Date as the
dependent variable. We estimated the CAR using a market model based on 255 trading days ending 50 days prior
to the earnings announcement date and using the CRSP value-weighted market index. Unexpected earnings
(UEPS) are derived by subtracting the most recent IBES median consensus quarterly forecast prior to the earnings announcement from IBES actual earnings, scaled by price at the end of the fiscal quarter. Models are estimated only on observations with Studentized residuals with an absolute value of 2 or lower.

1 percent level in Model 2 (Both). The coefficient on UEPS * Post is negative and significant at the 10 percent level in Model 3 (Class Action Only). If both the SEC and private
litigants or private litigants alone are involved in an action, investors place less weight on
earnings reports after the Violation Date, consistent with a loss of credibility. Overall, these
results suggest that investors have lost confidence in the earnings announcements of companies in the Both and Class Action Only categories, but not in firms in the SEC Only category. We therefore do not find evidence that the SEC is more precise in targeting
disclosure violations compared with private plaintiffs’ attorneys. These results are inconsistent with Hypothesis 1 (Earnings Responsiveness Hypothesis).10

10

As a robustness test, we reestimated the models of Table 3 with standard errors clustered by company. Unreported, the results remained largely the same. The coefficient on UEPS * Post is negative and significant (at the
1 percent level) only for the Both model. The coefficient on UEPS * Post is positive and now significant at the
5 percent level for the SEC Only model, indicating that, if anything, investors become more willing to rely on
information following the first public announcement of the underlying violation for the SEC Only category. The
coefficient on UEPS * Post remains negative but is no longer significant for the Class Action Only model.
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We reestimate Models 1, 2, and 3 using our three screened subsamples. The
results, which we do not tabulate in order to conserve space, are similar to Models 1
and 3. In the SEC Only (Formal), SEC Only (Settle), and SEC Only (Settle Rule 10b-5)
regressions, the UEPS * Post coefficients are not significantly different from zero.
Unlike Model 2 of Table 3, in the Both (Formal), Both (Settle), and Both (Settle Rule
10b-5) regressions, the UEPS * Post coefficients are not significantly different from zero.
Unlike in Model 3 of Table 3, in the Class Action Only (Formal), Class Action Only
(Settle), and Class Action Only (Settle Rule 10b-5) regressions, the UEPS * Post coefficients are also not significantly different from zero. While we do not find evidence that
investors have lost more confidence in firms in the Both and Class Action Only categories compared with the SEC Only category in the three screened subsamples, we also do
not find that investors view firms in the SEC Only category as worse compared with the
other two categories. Overall, these results do not support Hypothesis 1 and suggest that
investors have not lost more confidence in earnings announcements from firms in the
SEC Only category relative to Class Action Only.
2. Changes in Institutional Ownership
Our next test examines changes in institutional ownership. Our measure of institutional
ownership is the sum of Form 13F ownership for a particular quarter, divided by the
shares outstanding. We obtain the data on 13F filings from Thomson Reuters. Institutions
are required to file 13F forms quarterly, so our measures rely on those reporting dates.
We calculate the difference between the level of institutional holdings (1) for the quarter
prior to the quarter that includes the Violation Date and (2) for the quarter after the quarter that includes the Violation Date (Change in Institutional Holdings). We postulate that
institutional investors, who are more likely to trade than retail investors, will reduce their
holdings in companies accused of disclosure violations because they lose trust in management’s disclosures (Burns et al. 2010).
We use the Change in Institutional Holdings as a dependent variable in an ordinary
least squares regression. The model, estimated with robust standard errors, is as follows.
Change in Institutional Holdingsi 5a1ß1i SEC Onlyi 1ß2i Class Action Onlyi
1ß3i Accountingi 1ß4i Restatementi 1ß5i Market Cap:i 1ß6i Adj Reti 1Industry Controls1ei
We include indicator variables for SEC Only and Class Action Only, with Both as the
base comparison category. As with the prior regressions, we include indicator variables for restatements and accounting issues, the log of market capitalization, one-digit
SIC code industry indicator variables, and year indicator variables for the year of the
first public announcement of the violation. To control for the possibility that institutions may be selling due to poor performance rather than a disclosure problem, we
also include Adj Ret, defined as the one-year return up to one week prior to the Violation Date, adjusted by the value-weighted CRSP index return for the same period.
Given the disparities in the incidence of restatements and market capitalization
reported in Table 1, Panel B, we also restricted our pool of observations following the
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Table 4: Changes in Holdings by Institutional Investors

SEC Only
Class Action Only
Accounting
Restatement
Market Cap
Adj Ret
Constant
Industry controls
Year controls
N
Adj. R2

Model 1
All

Model 2
(Formal 1 Win MTD)

Model 3
(Settle)

Model 4
(Settle 10b-5)

0.040**
(0.012)
0.020
(0.013)
20.005
(0.019)
0.004
(0.011)
0.011**
(0.003)
0.020**
(0.006)
20.122**
(0.045)
Yes
Yes
624
0.051

0.054**
(0.015)
0.022
(0.019)
0.019
(0.032)
0.008
(0.017)
0.018**
(0.004)
0.032**
(0.009)
20.170**
(0.054)
Yes
Yes
354
0.083

0.046**
(0.017)
0.026
(0.019)
0.027
(0.036)
0.008
(0.018)
0.016**
(0.004)
0.028**
(0.010)
20.175**
(0.059)
Yes
Yes
296
0.063

0.075**
(0.023)
0.026
(0.021)
0.044
(0.043)
0.002
(0.022)
0.020**
(0.005)
0.028**
(0.011)
20.187**
(0.068)
Yes
Yes
236
0.078

NOTES: Dependent variable is change in institutional holdings measured from 21Q to 11Q around the quarter
containing the Violation Date. Standard errors in parentheses; 1 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Ordinary least
squares regression with robust standard errors. F test of difference of coefficients between SEC Only and Class
Action Only in Models 1, 2, 3, and 4: 0.066, 0.072, 0.286, and 0.082.

procedure in Crump et al. (2009). Specifically, we estimate propensity scores using
the independent variables in our model using a multinomial regression. We then discard all units with estimated propensity scores outside the range [0.1, 0.9].11 The
results of the model are presented in Model 1 of Table 4. We reestimate the model
for the Formal 1 Win MTD, Settle, and Settle 10b-5 subsets and report the results in
Models 2, 3, and 4 of Table 4, respectively.
The coefficients for SEC Only are positive in all four models (significant at the
1 percent level). The change in the amount of institutional investor ownership for
the SEC Only category is significantly less negative than the Both category. For our
sample, institutional investors are more willing to hold the shares of a company that
faces an SEC investigation compared to firms that face both the SEC and private
plaintiffs’ attorneys. In contrast, the coefficient for Class Action Only is not significantly different from zero in any of the models, consistent with a similar change in
institutional ownership with the Both category. The difference between the SEC Only
and Class Action Only coefficients is significant at the 10 percent level in Models 1, 2,
and 4 but insignificant in Model 3. We do not find evidence that the SEC is more precise in targeting disclosure violations compared with private plaintiffs’ attorneys. If
anything, the change in institutional ownership is consistent with greater loss of

11

This process is repeated for the two sets of tests that follow.

SEC Investigations and Securities Class Actions

43

credibility following disclosure violations targeted by private plaintiffs’ attorneys.
Overall, these results are inconsistent with Hypothesis 2 (Institutional Ownership
Hypothesis).12

3. Changes in Bid-Ask Spread
Our final set of market tests looks at a measure particularly focused on information asymmetry, bid-ask spread. If market participants believe that there is information asymmetry
among the traders for a company’s shares, they will incorporate that possibility into the
trading cost. We follow the methodology of Dechow et al. (1996). We first estimate a
model for the predicted bid-ask spread using all Nasdaq companies for 2004 to 2007.13
We then look at two windows, from 2100 to 210, and 110 to 1100, around the Violation Date, computing the mean residual bid-ask spread for both. The residual spread for
each firm is its actual bid-ask spread minus the predicted bid-ask spread. We then compute the change in mean residual spread from the window before the Violation Date to
the window after the Violation Date (Change in Residual Bid-Ask Spread).
We estimate an ordinary least squares model with the log of the Change in the
Residual Bid-Ask Spread as the dependent variable. The model, estimated with robust
standard errors, is:
lnðChange in Residual Bid-Ask SpreadÞi 5a1ß1i SEC Onlyi 1ß2i Class Action Onlyi
1ß3i Accountingi 1ß4i Restatementi 1ß5i Market Capi 1Industry Controls
1Year Controls1ei
We include indicator variables for SEC Only and Class Action Only, with Both as the
base comparison category. We include Accounting, Restatement, and the log of Market
Capitalization as independent variables. We also include one-digit SIC code industry
indicator variables and year indicator variables for the year of the first public announcement of the violation. The results of the estimation are presented in Model 1 of Table
12

As a robustness test, for each company observation in the models of Table 4 we computed the average change
in institutional ownership for other companies in the same three-digit SIC code measured as the difference
between (1) the quarter prior to the quarter that includes the Violation Date and (2) the quarter after the quarter
that includes the Violation Date. We remove the industry control variables and instead include the industry
change in institutional ownership as an independent variable to the models of Table 4. Unreported, we obtain
the same qualitative results as in Table 4; none of the industry change in institutional ownership variables was significantly different from zero in the models. As a further robustness test, we reestimated the models of Table 4
with standard errors clustered by company. Unreported, we obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 4.

13

We ran an ordinary least squares model using the actual daily bid-ask spread for Nasdaq companies from 2004
to 2007 using the log of trading volume, log of the number of market makers, and the log of the price as independent variables. We then used the model to predict the bid-ask spread for a particular company on a particular
date. As a robustness test we also estimated the same ordinary least squares model using the actual daily bid-ask
spread for NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq companies from 2004 to 2007. Unreported, using this alternate measure of
the predicted bid-ask spread, we obtained the same qualitative results as in the models of Table 5.
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Table 5: Change in Residual Bid-Ask Spread

SEC Only
Class Action Only
Accounting
Restatement
Market Cap
Constant
Industry controls
Year controls
N
Adj. R2

Model 1
All

Model 2
(Formal 1 Win MTD)

Model 3
(Settle)

Model 4
(Settle 10b-5)

20.009**
(0.003)
0.001
(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)
0.005*
(0.002)
0.089
(0.161)
20.850
(1.566)
Yes
Yes
360
0.062

20.012**
(0.004)
0.001
(0.005)
0.001
(0.006)
0.004
(0.003)
0.048
(0.200)
20.451
(1.952)
Yes
Yes
195
0.012

20.013**
(0.004)
0.001
(0.005)
0.001
(0.006)
0.004
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
0.014
(0.011)
Yes
Yes
169
20.001

20.010*
(0.005)
0.002
(0.005)
0.001
(0.008)
0.001
(0.004)
0.000
(0.000)
0.012
(0.014)
Yes
Yes
144
20.038

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; 1 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Ordinary least squares regression with the
log of the Change in Residual Bid-Ask Spread as the dependent variable estimated with robust standard errors.
Change in residual bid-ask spread is measured as the difference in the mean residual bid-ask spread for the two
time periods from 2100 days to 210 days and 110 to 1100 around the Violation Date. F test of difference of coefficients between SEC Only and Class Action Only in Models 1, 2, 3, and 4: 0.001, 0.000, 0.001, and 0.020.

5. We reestimate the model for the Formal 1 Win MTD, Settle, and Settle 10b-5 subsamples and report the results in Models 2, 3, and 4 of Table 5, respectively.
The coefficient for SEC Only is negative and significant in all four models (at the 1
percent level in Models 1 through 3, and at the 5 percent level in Model 4). This result
indicates that investors did not appreciably change their perception of information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread for the SEC Only category, while investors
became more concerned with information asymmetry for the Both category. The coefficient for Class Action Only is insignificant in all four models. F tests of the differences
between SEC Only and Class Action Only are significant at the 1 percent level for all four
models.14 We do not find evidence that the SEC is more precise in targeting disclosure
violations compared with private plaintiffs’ attorneys. If anything, the change in the bidask spread is consistent with disclosure violations targeted by private plaintiffs’ attorneys
leading to greater concerns of information asymmetry. These findings contradict Hypothesis 3 (Bid-Ask Spread Hypothesis).15

14

We note that the coefficient for Market Cap is positive in all models. Table 1, Panel B shows that that the Class
Action Only category targets smaller firms on average, so it is possible that the result here is driven by that disparity in size.

15

As a robustness test, we reestimated the models of Table 5 with standard errors clustered by company. Unreported, we obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 5.
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B. Officer Terminations
In this section, we turn to consequences for officers, which may correlate with the
strength of the evidence of a disclosure violation and individual culpability for that violation or, alternatively, the intensity of litigation. We examine whether the CEO or
CFO resigned or was terminated due to the subject matter of the underlying disclosure
violation. Officer Resign is defined as 1 if the CEO or CFO resigns for reasons related
to the underlying securities law violation (as determined from court documents, SEC
filings, and litigation releases) and 0 otherwise.
We estimate a logistic regression model with Officer Resign as the binary dependent variable; resignation is coded as 1. The model is as follows:
ProbðOfficer ResignÞi 5a1ß1i SEC Onlyi 1ß2i Class Action Onlyi 1ß3i Accountingi
1ß4i Restatementi 1ß5i Market Capi 1ß6i Adj Reti 1Industry Controls1Year Controls1ei
We include indicator variables for SEC Only and Class Action Only, with Both as the
base comparison category. For our control variables, we use indicator variables for an
accounting problem or a restatement. We include the log of market capitalization and
adjusted return (defined as the one-year return up to one week prior to first public disclosure date, adjusted by the value-weighted CRSP index return for the same period).
CEOs and CFOs are more likely to resign from companies that have poor stock market
returns. We also include one-digit SIC code industry indicator variables and year indicator variables for the year of the first public announcement of the violation. We present
the results of these estimations in Model 1 of Table 6. We reestimate the model for the
Formal 1 Win MTD, Settle, and Settle 10b-5 subsets and report the results in Models 2,
3, and 4 of Table 6, respectively.
Note that the coefficient on SEC Only is negative and significant at the 1 percent
level in the first three models and significant at the 10 percent level in Model 4. These
results indicate that the incidence of CEO or CFO resignation is smaller for SEC actions
compared with the base Both category. The coefficient on Class Action Only is insignificant in all four models. The coefficient on SEC Only is more negative than Class Action
Only in Models 1 through 3 (an F test of the difference is significant at the 1 percent
level in Models 1 and 2 and at the 5 percent level in Model 3), although the difference
is insignificant in Model 4. Overall, we do not find evidence that the SEC is more precise in targeting disclosure violations compared with private plaintiffs’ attorneys. The
incidence of CEO or CFO resignation is lower for SEC Only investigations—suggesting
that directors perceive stand-alone SEC investigations as less serious than class actions.
We view these results as contradicting Hypothesis 4 (Officer Resignation Hypothesis).16

16

As a robustness test, we reestimated the models of Table 6 with standard errors clustered by company. Unreported, we obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 6.
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Table 6: Logit Model of Officer Resignation Likelihood

SEC Only
Class Action Only
Accounting
Restatement
Market Cap
Adj Ret
Constant
Industry controls
Year controls
N
Pseudo R2

Model 1
All

Model 2
(Formal 1 Win MTD)

Model 3
(Settle)

Model 4
(Settle 10b-5)

21.116**
(0.239)
20.369
(0.236)
20.265
(0.305)
1.414**
(0.214)
20.136*
(0.0541)
20.059
(0.125)
0.574
(0.836)
Yes
Yes
696
0.172

21.218**
(0.302)
20.263
(0.300)
20.164
(0.400)
1.227**
(0.265)
20.1281
(0.0685)
20.008
(0.164)
1.482
(1.042)
Yes
Yes
397
0.177

20.980**
(0.339)
20.252
(0.315)
20.401
(0.440)
1.151**
(0.284)
20.1361
(0.0725)
0.027
(0.179)
1.394
(1.054)
Yes
Yes
333
0.152

20.8631
(0.499)
20.276
(0.341)
20.595
(0.506)
1.184**
(0.341)
20.133
(0.0830)
20.034
(0.189)
1.531
(1.193)
Yes
Yes
260
0.159

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; 1 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Dependent variable is the incidence of
Officer Resigns, defined as 1 where the CEO or CFO resigns for reasons related to the underlying securities law
violation as determined from court documents and SEC filings and litigation releases and 0 otherwise. F test of
difference of coefficients between SEC and Class Action in Models 1, 2, 3, and 4: 0.002, 0.003, 0.038, and 0.285.

V. CONCLUSION
Critics of securities fraud class actions have traditionally argued that SEC enforcement is
more likely to focus on actual cases of fraud. The empirical evidence supporting that
argument, however, largely comes from studies examining SEC enforcement actions
rather than investigations. Enforcement actions have been carefully screened by the SEC
based on substantial investigation before filing. To put SEC enforcement and securities
fraud class actions on a level playing field, we compare instead SEC investigations with
class action filings.
In tests looking at market measures of the possibility of information asymmetry,
we find that, relative to SEC Only investigations, earnings responsiveness and institutional ownership decline more for the Class Action Only cases after the revelation of a
disclosure problem, while the bid-ask spread increases more. These market measures of
disclosure credibility suggest that private class action attorneys target disclosure violations more precisely than the SEC. We also find evidence that the SEC Only category
has a significantly lower incidence of top officer resignations relative to the Class Action
Only category. If officer resignations stem from directors uncovering evidence of fraud
in their internal investigations, this result also undermines the frequently invoked argument that SEC enforcement targets disclosure violations more accurately than plaintiffs’
lawyers.
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Our comparative analysis of SEC and plaintiffs’ attorney targeting of suits implicitly assumes that targeting would not change if one or the other enforcement mechanism was eliminated, but it is conceivable that the SEC would change its practices if
class actions were eliminated.17 Nonetheless, we believe that institutional features that
lead the SEC to target more marginal cases in the SEC Only category would continue to
affect how the SEC targets cases even in the absence of the class action mechanism.
We also cannot rule out the possibility that the enforcement pattern shown here
is an optimal separating equilibrium. The SEC may be pursuing cases that, although
important for investor protection, are not recognized as such by our measures, which
correlate with the likelihood of intentional disclosure violations. Alternatively, market
participants may not recognize the importance of SEC investigations if they are not
accompanied by a class action. Our tests do not capture the overall deterrent value of
SEC enforcement relative to private class actions. The examination of other possible
benefits from SEC enforcement is an important topic for future research.
Finally, our statistical analysis is subject to the usual caveats about selection bias
and the potential for omitted variables. The SEC and class action attorneys are not
selecting randomly from the universe of potential violations. There may be factors for
which we do not control that may be driving the results here, so our analysis is certainly
not the last word on the topic.
Overall, the evidence presented here does not suggest that SEC enforcement is
more precisely targeted than class actions. Our results suggest that private plaintiffs’
attorneys, if anything, are more likely to pursue intentional disclosure violations compared to the SEC. From a policy perspective, our findings offer little support to commentators who call for a shift from private actions to greater public enforcement.
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Appendix: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

Variable
SEC Only
Class Action
Only
Both
Accounting
Restatement

Definition
Indicator variable equal to 1 if there is only a SEC investigation and no securities
class action for the particular company violation.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if there is only a securities class action and no
SEC investigation for the particular company violation.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if there is both a SEC investigation and a securities
class action for the particular company violation.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if accounting issues not involving a restatement are
related to the SEC investigation and/or class action suit.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm restated earnings that are related to the
SEC investigation and/or class action suit.

SEC Investigations and Securities Class Actions

Appendix
Variable
Market Cap

Market/Book

Beta
Adj Ret
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Continued
Definition
Log of market value of common equity for the issuer in question at the end
of calendar year preceding the commencement of the SEC investigation (or if
there was no SEC investigation, the class action filing).
Market value of common equity for the issuer in question divided by the book
value of common equity measured at the end of the fiscal quarter in question.
For the earning response coefficient models, these are the quarters immediately
preceding and following the quarter containing the Violation Date.
Beta is the market model beta estimated for 255 trading days ending 50 trading
days prior to the quarter earnings announcement date.
The one-year return up to one week prior to first public disclosure date for the
issuer in question, adjusted by the value-weighted CRSP index return for the
same period.

